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@jemoka / Jemoka Knowledge Base / wiki/concepts/sir_model.md
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--- title: "SIR Model" type: concept related: [Sir Model] source: https://www.jemoka.com/posts/kbhsir_model/ confidence: high status: active --- The SIR Model is a model to show how diseases spread. Susceptible – # of susceptible people Infectious — # of infectious people Removed — # of removed people Compartmental SIR model S => I => R [ => S] So then, the question is: what is the transfer rate between populations between these compartments? Parameters: \(R_0\) “reproductive rate”: the number of people that one infectious person will infect over the duration of their entire infectious period, if the rest of the population is entirely susceptible (only appropriate for a short duration) \(D\) “duration”: duration of the infectious period \(N\) “number”: population size (fixed) Transition I to R: \begin{equation} \frac{I}{D} \end{equation} \(I\) is the number of infectious people, and \(\frac{1}{D}\) is the number of people that recover/remove per day (i.e. because the duration is \(D\).) Transition from S to I: \begin{equation} I \frac{R_0}{D} \frac{S}{N} \end{equation} So for \(\frac{R_0}{D}\) is the number of people able to infect per day, \(\frac{S}{N}\) is the percentage of population that’s able to infect, and \(I\) are the number of people doing the infecting. And so therefore— \(\dv{S}{T} = -\frac{SIR_{0}}{DN}\) \(\dv{I}{T} = \frac{SIR_{0}}{DN}\) \(\dv{I}{T} = \frac{I}{D}\) Evolutionary Game Theory Suppose that we have two strategies, \(A\) and \(B\), and they have some payoff matrix: A B A (a,a) (b,c) B (c,b) (d,d) and we have some values: \begin{equation} \mqty(x_{a} \\x_{b}) \end{equation} are the relative abundances (i.e. that \(xa+xb\)). The finesses (“how much are you going to reproduce”) of the strategies are determined by— \(f_{A}(x_{A}, x_{B}) = ax_{A} + bx_{B}\) \(f_{B}(x_{A}, x_{B}) = cx_{A} + dx_{B}\) Except for payoff constants \((a,b,c,d)\), everything else is a function of time. The mean fitness, then: \begin{equation} q = x_{A}f_{A} + x_{B}f_{B} \end{equation} Let’s have the actual, absolute number of individuals: \begin{equation} \mqty(N_{A}\\ N_{B}) \end{equation} So, we can talk about the change is individuals using strategy \(A\): \begin{equation} \dv t x_{A} = \dv t \frac{N_{A}}{N} = X_{A}(f_{a}) \end{equation}